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I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center in December 2008 for almost two weeks in 
order to conduct research for my book about the relations between Nazi Germany and 
Colombia. One of the research goals was to find out what role the U.S. played in those 
relations. The Roosevelt administration was suspicious of all kinds of German activities in 
Colombia and not only gathered information about Germans and Germany, but also took 
measures and created policies to undermine them. I wanted to find information not only 
about the German activities in Colombia, but also about the actions and measures taken 
against the Germans and about the persons and institutions responsible for those measures. 
Although I found very little about Colombia, what I did find was that the office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), led by Nelson A. Rockefeller, conducted a 
series of anti-German activities in Latin America in general, and some specifically in 
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Colombia. The following is a description of the fields of action that show the broad scope 
of actions undertaken by the CIAA. The cases cited will focus mainly on Colombia. 
It is important to note that this report is based solely on CIAA documents, which 
represent the way the CIAA saw itself and the way it saw Latin America and Germany, and 
no other documentation has been introduced in order to verify or refute the information 
herein presented. Therefore the documents present, for example, a very positive 
perspective, constantly acknowledging success. It is also important to keep in mind, for 
instance, that there is an immense bibliography that points to the fact that the Nazi threat in 
Latin America was a myth, partly created by the U.S., and therefore some information 
about Nazi Germany might not be correct. Here is a summary of what I found that might be 
of some interest to other researchers and let‟s not forget that the CIAA undertook a series of 
tasks that might be compared to other American agencies or institutions.  
One of the hypotheses of my research affirms that the struggle for influence 
between the U.S. and Germany as they sought to penetrate Colombia had various sides: the 
struggle for political influence and markets, but also psychological warfare, or propaganda. 
But what I want to introduce here is an example of a broader topic, namely that WWII gave 
the U.S. the perfect opportunity to occupy broader roles and spaces in Latin America. The 
war made possible an American penetration like never before. During WWII, Nazi 
Germany disappeared from Latin America and the U.S. came in. The CIAA is a case in 
point and that is exactly the context in which it was established. All this is a good example 
of infiltration in that it eliminates the competition, the enemy. 
The establishment of the CIAA, according to one of its reports, was in direct 
correlation with Germany and the Germans in Latin America. Latin America had already 
been important in several ways in the Nazi blueprint for domination. For Nazi Germany, 
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Latin America was important because of its raw materials, as a market for German 
products, and a destination for German immigration. Most of the Germans were in 
organizations directed from Berlin. Economic penetration had been interlocked with 
propaganda programs designed to arouse antagonism against the U.S. that were 
disseminated through German firms, schools, cultural centers, press agencies, motion 
pictures, radio stations, and other societies.  
During Rockefeller‟s visit to Latin America in 1938, he noticed how German 
immigrants had stayed on the continent, married locals, established businesses, and acted as 
agents and distributors of German products, while Americans came only for business, were 
not permanent settlers, did not interest themselves in the countries in which they lived, and 
did not assimilate with the local population. According to Rockefeller, the newer 
immigrants became the nucleus of Nazi penetration; the new generation of Germans 
assumed the ascendancy over the older and more conservative group; and loss of European 
markets for Latin America made it imperative that steps were taken. The fall of France in 
the spring of 1940 spurred the creation of the CIAA in August of the same year.  
Before looking at the many tasks in which the CIAA was involved, let‟s take a look 
at what Rockefeller called the “philosophy” of his organization. Since the U.S. needed 
Latin America for economic and military reasons in order to secure their support, “each 
individual Latin American must believe the „U.S. Credo‟ [and] each individual Latin 
American must not believe the „Axis Credo.‟” According to Rockefeller, the first one was 
founded in truth and therefore was in the best interest of Latin Americans; the other one 
was based on falsehood. But also each American citizen must believe the “Latin American 
Credo”. The efforts of the U.S. government and of the CIAA were to be dedicated to the 
task of strengthening the “U.S. Credo” and weakening the “Axis Credo” in the minds of the 
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Latin Americans. Simultaneously the “Latin American Credo” was to be demonstrated to 
the Americans. The task consisted of convincing Latin Americans of accepting certain 
principles as their own: “I believe that my best interests are linked with the U.S. ... I believe 
that my best interests will be harmed by the Axis ... I believe that the U.S. is going to win 
this war, although it will be a difficult struggle ... Therefore I am supporting the U.S. and 
stand ready to cooperate with the Americas and to make additional personal sacrifices 
along with the American people so that I can help the U.S. win the war and establish a 
better world.” 
The task was, according to Rockefeller, to make each individual believe in the “U.S. 
Credo” and not to believe the “Axis Credo.” Through the first one, people should believe 
that the best interests of the people of Latin America were linked with the U.S. because of 
its way of life and the Good Neighbor Policy, because they would acquire a better standard 
of living, greater personal security, and more individual freedom. The “Axis credo,” on the 
other hand, would bring subjugation and oppression and was a threat of world domination. 
A good example of the vision that the CIAA had is the report “A Hundred Years of 
German Ambitions in Latin America,” which deals with “the German imperialistic 
ambitions in their true perspective” and is “a compilation of statements by Pan-German 
leaders from 1846 to 1918”. The report states that “German conspiracies for the conquest of 
parts or of all of South America are by no means solely the outgrowth of Hitlerism....” 
The main justifications for the creation of the CIAA, according to the CIAA itself, 
were the danger of Axis aggression, the work necessary for the defense of the hemisphere, 
and construction of hemisphere solidarity. The CIAA knew that security for the U.S. also 
meant prosperity in Latin America and promoted cultural understanding and sympathy. 
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Another report says clearly that from its inception the CIAA had two important fields of 
operation: the economic and the psychological one. 
In the economic field the CIAA was concerned with the commercial, financial, and 
economic situation of the other American republics, and with bringing together government 
agencies and private concerns. It is interesting to note that the plan was to eliminate 
companies from trade during the war and after. The anti-German position of the CIAA was 
clear from the very beginning, developing a program for the elimination of Axis control 
over airlines. Among the first activities was an exhaustive study of the German airlines that 
revealed that a large number of airlines were owned by Axis interests, which resulted in 
their elimination and the compilation of a voluntary blacklist of agents and sales outlets 
identified with Axis interests.  
The U.S. had begun to pay attention to this problem as early as 1939, when a series 
of conferences were held and the State Department had some success in eliminating Axis 
control over an airline in Colombia. Beyond this however, no great progress had been 
achieved because of the division of authority between the various interested agencies and 
departments, and because of lack of funds needed to replace the Axis interest if the latter 
were eliminated. The CIAA‟s investigation showed the various dangers to the hemisphere 
posed by the activities of German and Italian airlines in the dissemination of anti-U.S. 
propaganda; as an important means of communication between the Axis governments and 
their sympathizers; through their control of strategic bases, which would be of value in the 
event of an Axis invasion; and as medium of training German personnel on Latin American 
terrain. The eventual elimination of the Axis airlines brought forward the problem of the 
lack of pilots, mechanics, and engineers, so the CIAA initiated a program to train such 
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personnel and even provided certain transportation expenses to Latin American students to 
travel to the U.S. 
The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals resulted from a study made by 
the CIAA in collaboration with the Department of State and Commerce, which was started 
in September 1940. The CIAA justified its actions as being instrumental in elaborating that 
list because “…a substantial source of revenue for Axis powers in Central and South 
America was money derived from the anti-American representatives of United States 
business in those countries.” Another report says that one of the most important operations 
was to study how many American businesses were in the hands of anti-American business, 
concerns that were contrary to the best interests of the American republics. Some of them 
used to sell European products, but with the beginning of the war they became 
representatives of U.S. products. Five thousand firms were under consideration until the 
Proclaimed List was made up. A total of one thousand firms were selected because they 
were making profits on American goods and thus were supporting Nazi organizations. The 
list forced companies to change their representatives, cutting off one of the major sources 
of income for Nazi interests in Latin America.  
Also, the CIAA sought to persuade American firms to buy Latin American goods 
and to provide loans through the Export-Import Bank to various countries. The CIAA also 
complained that one of the greatest difficulties was stimulating American entrepreneurship 
in Latin America.  
Contact with and support of the local elite were integral. In order to stimulate trade 
among the American republics, on May 14, 1941, Rockefeller announced the establishment 
of the Colombian National Council, the eighth of twenty-one councils established by the 
Inter-American Development Commission. The council, with a total of five members, 
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included members of the Colombian political and economical elite. It was headed by 
Mariano Roldán, minister of the National Economy and chairman of the Instituto de 
Fomento Industrial, and the vice-chairman Roberto Michelsen, general manager of the 
Banco de la República.  
The so-called Communications Division started with a study of the entire 
communications system of the hemisphere: radio and telegraph systems, largely owned by 
Nazi groups. It had the task of increasing technical facilities of communication in order to 
attain mass coverage in several countries; improving the quality of the material to be 
communicated; counteracting the dissemination of ideas unfavorable to hemisphere 
defense; and developing and spreading ideas favorable to the interest of the U.S. together 
with those of the American republics. Rockefeller knew that “propaganda consists of 
stimuli [original underlined]; and the entire process of employing certain media to convey 
the stimuli in order to bring about the desired response is what is known as psychological 
warfare.” With the maintenance of economic stability, political independence, and a sense 
of security, Latin America would be able to withstand the Axis propaganda and what 
Rockefeller called “the intellectual imperialism of ideas [that is] just as serious a threat ... as 
the possibility of a military invasion.” The CIAA tried to “answer to all propaganda lies 
that [were] being spread about what [was] going on in Europe and the U.S.” 
All cultural activities were, according to the CIAA, forms of propagation of 
friendship or of enmity, as well as another medium of communicating between the peoples 
and of strengthening bonds. The CIAA itself had no competitors in the information field at 
the start and began a dissemination of information to counteract the Axis propaganda 
program, which was transmitted through their radio, news columns, and subsidized press. 
The method consisted of thoroughly informing the public of what was taking place in the 
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U.S. and abroad. Of course, nothing could threaten the war effort, and the information 
materials were selected if they were favorable. It also initiated a program of activities on 
the radio, in art exhibitions, concerts, motion pictures, and the press to further promote 
understanding and friendship between the Latin American countries and the United States.  
One good example of another function of the CIAA is the press releases that were 
used to refute German propaganda. For example, when the Berlin Institute for Business 
Research stated in June 1941 that the Good Neighbor Policy failed because the U.S. could 
not afford to absorb Latin American surpluses resulting from the loss of European markets, 
the CIAA released a statement quoting figures and data.  
We know that the Germans in the 1930‟s started an ambitious plan of short wave 
radio that the U.S. didn‟t have. So from the beginning, the CIAA was aware that the 
European broadcasting stations were operating with much more power than the American 
ones, and that those based in Berlin, Rome, and London had superior equipment, thus 
delivering a stronger signal. Of the twelve short wave stations operating from the U.S., ten 
were at a loss, while two were financed by private subscription and little or no profit 
incentive existed. Berlin and London covered the densely populated areas while U.S. 
stations tried to cover all of Latin America without coordination of physical equipment.  
An example of the CIAA‟s success in radio penetration can be found, for example, 
in a report of the Coordination Committee activities. It conducted surveys in Colombia, one 
of which was conducted in Cartagena from November 8
th
 to December 19
th
, 1944, in order 
to evaluate how successful the locally transcribed programs were. The conclusion was that 
they “enjoy relatively great popularity in Cartagena.” Out of the 100 programs listed in the 
survey from the ones locally transcribed by the CIAA, seven were well placed because they 
came in the fifth place, fourteenth, nineteenth, twenty-second, twenty-seventh, thirtieth, and 
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thirty-seventh. The same survey deals with short wave programs and reports a greater 
success. Ninety programs are mentioned in the survey and one by the CIAA ranked in first 
place; others came in the third place, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, sixteenth, 
seventeenth, eighteenth, twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth. The report also states that 
Cromos, a very popular magazine in Colombia, published a leading article written by the 
Committee‟s Director of Information. 
A report states that by 1943, the CIAA had developed the following objectives: an 
increase in U.S. production of features pictures, short subjects and newsreels about the 
U.S.; eliminating Axis-sponsored and -produced pictures from exhibition throughout the 
hemisphere; and persuading producers that it was unwise to distribute in the other Americas 
pictures that created a bad impression of the United States and its way of life. The CIAA 
even went to motion picture industries and persuaded them not to sell to houses that 
showed Nazi films. 
Movies were very useful in several fields and were the most direct approach to the 
widest audience because of the high illiteracy rate. They were useful, for example, in 
furthering other aspects of the CIAA program like health and sanitation. As a new 
conception of relations, Rockefeller proposed to take into account when making films the 
cultural problems of peoples in Latin America. 
The CIAA saw itself as very successful in “…revitalizing U.S. newsreels going to 
Latin America into one of the most effective media for the propagation of the inter-
American idea and hemisphere solidarity, [which] represents a high-point in the 
administration of our entire psychological warfare program.” The CIAA was well aware of 
the important and costly efforts that Germany spent in Latin America during the 1930‟s 
trying to influence public opinion and be active in preparing and distributing newsreels. 
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The propaganda newsreels were distributed free or at a nominal charge and received state 
subsidies as well as extensive distribution. One the other hand, the CIAA was also aware of 
the minor treatment by American producers to newsreels although these started to circulate 
in Latin America in 1936. Producers made no particular effort to obtain special Latin 
American subjects for their reels and contented themselves with occasional stock shots of 
fiestas, carnivals, and earthquakes. Exported newsreels revealed North America as a nation 
of people who were utterly and completely publicity-mad, showing them as polar bear 
bathers or flag pole sitters. German newsreels were carefully planned, stressed military 
might, showed enthusiastic and vigorous youth, and prosperity and happiness. Special 
newsreels editions were regularly shipped to German embassies, where frequent private 
showings were arranged for specially invited influential officials. The CIAA started early in 
1941 to work on a newsreel program and during the war became a success because the 
CIAA started close cooperation with the Unites States newsreel companies. 
Specific examples of in the field of culture and science are the next ones: the CIAA 
backed a dispatch of ten archeological expeditions, including field surveys in Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Chile and other countries; was involved in scientific projects such as the 
training of 200 meteorologists of the Latin American republics in a school set up for that 
purpose in Medellín, Colombia; microfilmed scientific articles from American journals and 
supplied them on request to libraries and individuals; prepared detailed maps of Latin 
America to make them available to U.S. agencies and officials in Latin America; and 
published a series of pamphlets on American education that were distributed in Latin 
America. 
Some other fields of activities come to the fore when one reads the CIAA 
documents. Under the heading “Axis Radio Tactics,” the CIAA reported regularly about the 
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contents of the short wave radio programs broadcast from the Axis countries. These reports 
give a summary of Axis contents in their radio programs and a good idea of what their 
propaganda was like. For example, the U.S. exerts an imperialistic pressure and constructs 
military bases for the purpose of guaranteeing control of Latin America. Attacks on 
American culture were broadcast stating the lack of culture of the American people, talking 
about racial prejudices in the U.S. like the lynching of black people in the South, Wall 
Street plutocracy and avarice. When the Rio conference took place in January 1942, for 
instance, the broadcasts were directed at wrecking the conference. After the Rio 
conference, Berlin thought that Latin America surrendered to the U.S. and that “Roosevelt 
no longer needs to play the comedy of the Good Neighbor,” adding that “he is trying to 
construct a barrier of blood in Latin America.” 
Under the heading “Analysis of Publications in the other American Republics,” 
several publications, both newspapers and magazines, were scrutinized by the CIAA. El 
Siglo, one of Colombia‟s most important newspapers, is according to a report unfriendly to 
the U.S. but ambivalent because sometimes it attacks the Axis. But even Veritas, a rather 
local and small publication released in a small town called Chiquinquirá, Colombia, caught 
the CIAA‟s attention. It was reported that it was a Catholic weekly from the Franciscan 
Community that identified Russia and her allies with the “…forces of evil and the Axis 
with those of Good,” while suggesting that Great Britain and the U.S. were wicked.  
The heading “Clippings from Newspapers of other American Republics” shows an 
interest in the local press. Reading the report headings, one can easily see the topics that 
were relevant to the CIAA: politics, agriculture, coffee, education, of course 5
th
 column 
activities, aviation, finance, industry, high cost of living, church, foreign affairs, labor, 
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mines, press, public service, radio, rubber, shipping, trade, transportation, travel, war and 
government - the most diverse information from Latin America. 
Another field was the “Political report” in which the political situation of a country 
was analyzed, along with the political parties, their leaders, political events, etc. For 
example, a report about the fifth column in Colombia stated that it was very strong, 
supported by 3000 Germans - typical of so many other U.S. reports during the war. Or they 
also talk about how American or anti-American the parties or persons were.  
If we look at the context in which the CIAA was created and their fields of action, 
we easily realize that, beyond the declarations of solidarity and cooperation with the Latin 
American countries and the nice speech of friendship, the aim was clearly to collect 
information, exert influence on the U.S.‟s behalf, and eliminate all types of German 
influence in the area, and the vacuum void thus created would be filled with Americans. 
